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SECURITIES LAW SYMPOSIUM: PATH
DEPENDENCE AND COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOREWORD
RONALD J. MANN*
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT**
I. THE PATH DEPENDENCE CONCEPT
The study of institutions, and particularly the study of institutions that
societies use to govern business enterprises, is at a point of transition. In
the last two or three decades, scholars focusing on economic principles to
define appropriate legal rules and corporate institutions rose up to challenge
the traditional orthodoxy of corporate governance found in the Berle and
Means corporation.
One of the most exciting trends in the literature rests upon the "increas-
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, and Research Fellow, Olin
Center for Business, Law, and Economics. B.A. 1982, Rice University; J.D. 1985, University of Texas.
** Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, and Research Fellow, Olin
Center for Business, Law, and Economics. B.A. 1984, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1989, Columbia
Law School.
The authors benefitted from an informal workshop series on path dependence at Washington
University School of Law. Hideki Kanda and Michael Klausner, as well as colleagues Stuart Banner,
Pauline Kim, Robert Thompson, and Peter Wiedenbeck provided helpful comments on this Foreword.
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ing marginal returns" school of economics associated with Brian Arthur and
the Santa Fe Institute. The traditional neoclassical economic theory of
production, familiar from decades of undergraduate and graduate courses
in microeconomic theory, focuses on competition between products in
terms of decreasing marginal returns. The idea is that the economy will
settle to a competitive (and optimal) equilibrium at the point where the
decreasing marginal returns that sellers can obtain from increasing
production just equal the increasing marginal costs of producing more and
more units of a given product. As a producer increases the amount of
production of a given product, it must sell to purchasers less excited about
the product. Demand for additional units decreases, which in turn decreases
marginal revenue.
For the last fifteen years, however, the noted Stanford economist Brian
Arthur has been advancing an alternative to the traditional neoclassical
economic perspective. Arthur focuses on areas of the economy in which
marginal returns to production are increasing, not decreasing.' He argues
that in many situations a producer that increases production actually
increases the marginal revenue from the marginal unit. The general
mechanism for that increase is the "network" or "adoption" externality,
commonly associated with cutting-edge technologies. Think of the compact-
disc player in the late 1980s. Each person that purchased a compact-disc
player provided a benefit to every other purchaser by (among other things)
increasing the market for compact discs, thus increasing the incentive for
compact-disc manufacturers to produce musical recordings in that format.
That benefit-the network or adoption externality-drives the increasing
marginal returns to production that differentiate Arthur's approach from
neoclassical explanations.2 An important insight of this work is that the
equilibrium into which production settles depends upon the path through
which a producer travels: The ultimate equilibrium is path dependent.3 The
path dependence of the production equilibrium suggests, among other
I. See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY
1-32 (1994). For a lay summary of Brian Arthur's role in the development of this area of thought, see
M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS
15-51 (1992).
2. Among the leading early papers in the economic literature that discuss network or adoption
externality are Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 20 J. Pun.
ECON. 231 (1983); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16
RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); and Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,
and Compatibility, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 424 (1985).
3. See, e.g., ARTHUR, supra note 1, at 111-29.
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things, that we can have little confidence that the equilibrium position is in
fact the optimal position.
Arthur's ideas have ignited an extensive debate in the economic
literature, as various scholars assess the extent to which his analysis
provides the best explanation for a variety of historical phenomena ranging
from the adoption of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, to the success of
the VHS over the competing Betamax technology, to the development of
particular types of nuclear reactors.4 A related and equally important part
of the development has come from the work of Nobel laureate Douglass
North, who has applied similar tools in the area of institutional econom-
ics.5 In his recent collaboration with Arthur Denzau, North broadened the
reach of Arthur's perspective by showing how cognitive and heuristic
limitations can pose obstacles to change that have the same effects as the
economic obstacles that Arthur identified.6
More importantly for the present context, prominent corporate law
scholars have begun applying the insights of Arthur's analysis to issues
related to corporate institutions. In that vein, the work of Michael Klausner
and Marcel Kahan is of particular significance for this issue. Klausner and
Kahan have undertaken to examine the mechanisms that lead to path
dependence in corporate contracts and institutions. Klausner began by
showing how the network externalities associated with corporate contracts
call into question the conventional notion that economic forces promote the
development of optimal corporate contracting.7 Klausner and Kahan's
article in this issue,' together with a current working paper,9 have expand-
ed that analysis to consider how learning effects, informational cascades,
4. Compare W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 EcoN. J. 116 (1989) (arguing that the phenomenon is common) with S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1994, at 133 (arguing that the phenomenon is rare).
5. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 93-95 (1990).
6. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,
47 KYKLOS 3 (1994). For an ambitious application of North's analysis to the general problem of legal
change, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
7. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757 (1995).
8. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996).
9. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Corporate Contracting: Innovation, Standardization, and
the Role of Contracting Agents (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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and herd behavior among lawyers all can combine to lead rational, utility-
maximizing actors down a socially suboptimal path. The article in this
issue, in turn, extends that analysis to consider how cognitive biases can
contribute to that same effect.'0 From a different perspective, Mark Roe's
recent Harvard Law Review commentary on Chaos and Evolution in Law
and Economics" articulates a typology of the different ways in which the
externalities that arise from historical patterns can affect the development
of governance systems.
This symposium issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly
focuses the application of path dependence to corporate institutions on a
natural topic: comparative corporate governance. Inherent in the concept of
path dependence is the point that no set of institutions should be regarded
as perfect just because they are the result of the ungoverned operation of
the marketplace. Historical, ideological, and behavioral settings matter
because they set the path upon which institutions are formed. That point,
in turn, naturally suggests the value of comparing the ways in which
corporate institutions develop: the ways they develop in different settings
around the world, and the ways they develop as the sophistication of the
players increases within our own economy. That project is important not
only because it increases our knowledge of how corporate institutions
function, but also because it helps us to see how we might improve existing
institutions.
II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF PATH DEPENDENCE TO CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE SCHOLARSHIP
For all of its explanatory power, the concept of path dependence appears
remarkably commonplace, at least in hindsight. It is hardly controversial to
suggest that initial conditions matter, that ideologies and accidents affect
the design of institutions, and that past decisions shape current choices.
Historians and cognitive psychologists, among others, have been telling us
this for some time. 2
The implications of those relatively uncontroversial suggestions for
corporate governance, however, have been dramatic. Corporate laws and
institutions may persist not because they have withstood a Darwinian
10. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 8, at 359-65.
11. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HAPv. L. REv. 641 (1996).
12. See Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal Change, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 1129, 1147 n. 51 ("[P]ath dependent' is the term economists use because they can't bring
themselves to say the word 'history.").
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struggle for survival (thereby demonstrating their efficiency), but because
chance events have selected and then locked them into a particular path. 3
Search costs can create inertia toward remaining with a solution that is
"good enough" though not the "best" alternative. 4 The renaissance in
corporate law scholarship in the United States began when Mark Roe
stripped away the "Berle and Means blinders" 5 to show that the "modem
corporation" Berle and Means had described in the 1930s was more the
product of political ideology and historical circumstance than the pinnacle
of economic development.'
6
Edward Rock's article in this symposium issue 7 directly addresses the
question of how path dependence contributes to corporate governance
scholarship. Rock identifies two claims based on path dependence that
appear in the recent comparative corporate governance literature, one
positive and one normative. The positive claim is that American corporate
governance structures are historically and politically contingent. Japan and
Germany demonstrate that highly successful market economies can develop
with governance structures markedly different from our own. Normatively,
what Rock calls the reformist claim follows from the recognition that
alternatives to the U.S. system are possible: Perhaps the United States
would benefit by adopting the alternative mechanisms that may have
contributed to the competitiveness of the Japanese and German economies.
At the very least, the alternatives should be allowed to compete within the
U.S. economic system.
In the lead article,'" Ronald Gilson tries to advance both the positive
project (understanding when institutional differences influence economic
efficiency) and the normative project (improving the productivity of
national corporate governance systems). Gilson concludes that "path
dependency makes institutions matter" only in two circumstances: when
13. See ARTHUR, supra note 1, at 116-18. For a treatment of path dependence and evolution from
a legal perspective, see Roe, supra note 1 I, at 641-62.
14. The tendency to stop searching upon finding an adequate, albeit possibly suboptimal solution
is known as "satisficing."See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION xxviii (3d ed. 1976).
15. Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between
Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE W. 871, 881 (1993).
16. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10
(1991).
17. Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance,
74 WASH U. L.Q. 367 (1996).
18. Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996).
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they fit the dominant character and technology of industrial production in
a given economy, and when they act as "guardrails," continuously
channelling movements along a well-worn path even though a different
route would be optimal." Gilson's description of corporate governance
systems in major economies as involving a tradeoff between commitment
(found in the Japanese system) and adaptability (a key feature of the U.S.
system) frames his conclusion that future competitive success will require
simultaneous achievement of those two goals within one system.
The article in this issue by Steven Kaplan and Mark Ramseyer takes
a different perspective, arguing that the positive project must be undertaken
with considerable caution. Although the best of the literature in the field
has scrupulously avoided the trap, uncritical application of the path
dependence concept could obscure the economic constraints that influence
firm monitoring and decisionmaking in market economies worldwide.
Kaplan and Ramseyer thus rightly caution against the "easy application of
path-dependence to corporate governance."'" While accepting the histori-
cal and political contingency of the constraints in which firms operate, the
authors cite comparative econometric data on managerial incentives and
turnover to support their assertion that firms cannot escape "the basic logic
of the product and capital markets." This perspective suggests a more
limited role for corporate institutions; whatever the precise form of those
institutions (within broad ranges), firms that meet market challenges will
succeed and firms that do not will fail.
Normatively, the ability to adopt promising alternate governance
structures revealed by the newfound comparative perspective of corporate
law scholarship is severely limited by the very path dependence of those
structures. As the article by Hideki Kanda illustrates, crucial facets of
corporate governance are shaped by such vagaries as the unintended effects
of corporate tax rules.24 Moreover, as noted above, other recent scholar-
ship by Klausner suggests that important features of corporate practice
19. Gilson, supra note 18, at 341.
20. Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for
Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 403 (1996).
21. Id. at 407.
22. Id.
23. Hideki Kanda, Taxes and the Structure of Japanese Firms: The Hidden Aspects of Income
Taxation, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 393 (1996).
24. Id. at400 (suggesting that conflicting tax incentives may partially explain the Japanese keiretsu
system).
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persist due to network externalities.2" In a world where rules and institu-
tions develop chaotically, transplanting institutions formed in one social,
political, and historical setting onto foreign soil is an exceedingly complex
and unpredictable endeavor. The insights of path dependence support the
longstanding skepticism of comparative lawyers and economic historians
to the notion of transplantability.26
So what is the promise of path dependence for corporate scholarship?
We assert that the key to both the positive and normative claims of this
literature is their ability to render more transparent the logic (or illogic) that
undergirds our legal and economic institutions. A path dependence
perspective facilitates meaningful systems analysis of competing gover-
nance structures by unpacking the black box of culture and allowing us to
see the choices (and non-choices) that shape the development of institu-
tions. For example, an insight like the difficulty of transplanting flexible
enabling statutes of the kind found in Delaware corporate law to countries
with underdeveloped court systems 27 comes much more readily to a
scholar looking at the world through the lens of path dependence. The
reformist role for path dependence studies lies not in transplanting foreign
institutions, but in improving our understanding of the ways in which our
own choices are affected by cognitive biases, political ideologies, and
historical accidents. Because information costs are a major barrier to
reform,28 a first step in re-engineering suboptimal rules and institutions is
understanding how they arrived in their current form and recognizing that
superior alternatives might be available.29
A second contribution of the literature is the liberation of corporate
25. See Klausner, supra note 7.
26. This skepticism can be traced back to Montesquieu: "The political and civil laws of each
nation... must be so peculiar to the people for whom they are made; it is a very great accident should
those of one Nation suit another." CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, 1 DE L'ESPIRIT DES Loix
26 (Socit6 les Belles Lettres 1950). For a more recent example, see 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1, 27 (1974) ("[Wle cannot take for granted that rules
or institutions are transplantable."). Economic theorists are similarly reluctant to embrace the notion of
transplantability. See NORTH, supra note 5, at 6 ("Although formal rules may change overnight as the
result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes
of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies."). For a more sanguine view, see ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 100 (1974) ("[T]he creation of law for that precise society in which
it is operating is neither always common nor very important.").
27. Rock, supra note 17, at 387.
28. Roe, supra note 11, at 659.
29. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a
Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTiviTY 55 (1995).
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governance studies from their focus on static equilibrium responses to
specific governance problems. Path dependence emphasizes the way in
which constraints on firms are constantly, if often imperceptibly, shifting
along with market, technological, legal, and social changes.3" The
evolution metaphor captures the constant shifting and grinding that occurs
as some constraints are relegated to oblivion while others act as a brake on
a changing world.3
Looking ahead, there is much to be done. Theorists have advanced the
positive project to the point where we no longer take for granted the forces
that shape corporate governance structures. We are beginning to discern
possible linkages between institutional incentive structures and efficiency-
enhancing responses to governance problems. To borrow Gilson's phrasing,
we are beginning to understand when and how institutions matter in
corporate governance. Nonetheless, we suspect that existing scholarship
represents a fascinating research agenda rather than complete articulations
of these concepts. And an even larger challenge awaits. It remains for
scholars of corporate governance to- identify the institutional frameworks
that will encourage firms to adapt efficiently to the ever-accelerating
developments in technology, information, and finance while strengthening
credible commitments to beneficial structures. Identification of those
frameworks, in turn, cannot proceed until scholars understand the
mechanisms that translate those institutional frameworks into the actual
practice of corporate governance,32 a task that is likely to require a heavy
dose of empirical inquiry.33
By grappling with the implications of path dependence in corporate
30. For a study of the shifting constraints on Japanese firms, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational
Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 3 (1996).
31. See Roe, supra note 11. This dynamism exists notwithstanding potential "lock-in" of systems
at a suboptimal equilibrium. For a discussion of the lock-in effect, see Arthur, supra note 4. The
dichotomy between stability and dynamism is inherent in the related theories of chaos and complexity.
See URi MERRY, COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY 51 (1995) ("Human history is made up of successive
stages of relatively predictable stability and development along a particular path, separated by periods
of instability during which the future of the system is decided by small, chance events which push it
into one or another path."). For an evolutionary approach to economic change, see RICHARD R. NELSON
& SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
32. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549 (1984) (undertaking that task with respect to capital markets).
33. One of us has taken some initial steps toward identifying such mechanisms in the context of
the lending market. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997).
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governance, the contributions to this symposium demonstrate the promise
of interdisciplinary research in the field as well as the vitality of the new
comparativism in corporate law scholarship.
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